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For the past 18 months, the G-20 summit countries have worked 
together to contain the global economic crisis and encourage a 
sustainable economic recovery. As part of these efforts, the G-20 
leaders have sought to constrain the protectionist pressures that 
invariably arise during times of economic stress and to maintain 
an open international trading regime. The G-20 trade agenda, 
as enunciated in the three summit declarations, has covered 
two specific trade actions: a “standstill” on new protectionism 
and a charge to complete the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.
At their first summit in Washington in November 2008, 
the G-20 leaders recognized the “critical importance of rejecting 
protectionism” in the midst of the financial crisis and agreed 
not to make a bad situation worse through “beggar-thy-neigh-
bor” trade restrictions. The G-20 commitment was clear and 
comprehensive; summit leaders agreed for the following year 
to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade 
in  goods  and  services,  imposing  new  export  restrictions,  or 
implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent 
measures to stimulate exports.” In the event, many countries 
did not religiously apply this abstinence pledge; nonetheless, 
the G-20 trade standstill helped to substantially limit the impo-
sition of new protectionist measures.1
1. For a discussion of the initial standstill pledge at the Washington G-20 
Summit in November 2008, see Hufbauer and Schott (2008).
On the Doha Round, however, the G-20 track record has 
been unsatisfactory. The G-20 leaders committed at each of their 
summits “to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the 
Doha Development Round.” At Pittsburgh in September 2009, 
they set a deadline to do so in 2010. Sadly, these were empty 
words. Setting deadlines is a useless gesture unless accompanied 
by new instructions to their trade negotiators to improve Doha 
offers. To date, that has not occurred, as documented at the 
stocktaking meeting of the Doha Round in Geneva in March 
2010. The trade talks remain at an impasse and the window for 
concluding the round in 2010 has already closed.
GoinG Forward on Trade in 2010
G-20 leaders have two summit meetings scheduled for 2010: 
June in Toronto and November in Seoul. Trade is unlikely to 
be the headline issue at either session. But unless the leaders 
devote attention and political capital to the trade agenda, the 
Doha Round may go into deep hibernation, risking substantial 
damage to the multilateral trading system as countries pursue 
solutions to their trade and investment problems through more 
aggressive recourse to discriminatory arrangements and unilat-
eral protectionist measures.
What should the G-20 do on trade in 2010? First, the G-20 
leaders should rededicate themselves to advancing the Doha 
Round. But simply reciting the hortatory charge of past summits 
won’t do. To be credible, they will need to take concrete actions 
to secure meaningful progress in the talks this year. Second, 
the leaders should reiterate and amplify their antiprotection-
ism pledge. In particular, the leaders should consider extending 
their trade standstill to cover prospective border measures that 
could be instituted in conjunction with new carbon taxes and 
regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such 
considerations were shelved prior to the Copenhagen climate 
talks last December but now should be vetted anew in light of 
the limited results of that meeting.
G-20 and The doha round
The Doha Round merits continued attention and priority by 
the  G-20  leaders.  But  G-20  pronouncements  on  the  Doha N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 1   m a y   2 0 1 0
2
Round will not have credibility unless the leaders match their 
fine words with the kind of concrete action presaged in the 
Pittsburgh summit declaration, but never executed. Paragraph 
49 of the Pittsburgh summit declaration noted “the need for 
countries to directly engage with each other…in order to evalu-
ate and close the remaining gaps.” When the G-20 leaders meet 
again, they need to spell out how they will work together on 
outstanding problems in the Doha Round in a way that cata-
lyzes progress by all Doha participants.
The latest PIIE analysis of the potential gains from the 
Doha Round shows that the prospective liberalization gener-
ated by cutting tariffs and reducing farm subsidies (pursuant to 
formulas substantially agreed in draft Doha negotiating modali-
ties) would yield global export gains of about $90 billion and 
global GDP gains of about $60 billion—significant but not 
sufficient to coalesce the requisite political support to close a 
deal (see Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong 2010). Moreover, the 
distribution of the gains is skewed toward a few big countries 
and thus does not adequately fulfill the mandate that Doha 
should be a “Development Round.” For that reason, the offers 
on the table in Geneva need to be “topped up.” As the world’s 
leading trading nations, the G-20 summit countries need to 
lead by example in this effort. What needs to be done?
First,  the  G-20  members  need  to  make  good  on  their 
commitment to “fill in the gaps” in the Doha negotiations on 
agriculture, manufactures, and services. Each should commit 
to improve their Doha Round offers, commensurate with their 
development  status.  The  G-20  members  should  encourage 
other Doha participants to follow suit but recognize that for 
many developing countries, and especially the least developed, 
current Doha offers are sufficient.
Given the track record to date of the Doha negotiations, 
each G-20 leader will face opposition from domestic constitu-
encies if they put forward new Doha offers on agriculture and 
manufactures; business leaders and farmers are skeptical that 
the Doha Round will provide them meaningful payoffs. That 
is why the G-20 leaders need a coordinated approach—a Doha 
“stimulus  package”—in  which  all  the  major  trading  nations 
contribute new offers that would catalyze broader negotiations 
and presage the type of “ambitious and balanced” outcome that 
would garner support at home and abroad.
The key step to reengaging the Doha negotiations is the 
first step. To up the ante of a prospective Doha agreement, Pres-
ident Obama should take the lead with a new offer on US farm 
subsidies. Such an offer would demonstrate his commitment to 
long-run US budget reform and encourage his G-20 partners to 
make reciprocal offers on liberalizing barriers that impede US 
exports of farm products, manufactures and services.
To be sure, congressmen representing agricultural districts 
have actively resisted proposals that would sharply lower the 
maximum disbursement of subsidies “bound” in US obligations 
under the WTO that the US government could pay farmers 
each year—even though the new “ceiling” would still be well 
above the likely payouts under current US farm programs due 
to high commodity prices.2 In other words, such an offer would 
not cut the current level of subsidies received by US farmers 
but would limit additional payments if prices decline in the 
future. Other countries would “pay” for this concession because 
it  would  prevent  future  subsidies  competitions  and  would 
encourage Congress to restructure the next US farm bill to favor 
income-based, rather than production-based, support.
In turn, the other G-20 leaders should commit to invoke far 
fewer exceptions than permitted under the terms of the current 
draft accord on agriculture and to supplement “formula” tariff 
cuts on manufactures with additional reductions on products 
in sectors of interest to other G-20 countries. In addition, the 
G-20 leaders should give particular attention to the negotia-
tions on services, the area of the Doha Round agenda most in 
need of immediate action since only minimal progress has been 
made over the eight-year course of the negotiations. To that 
end, and as soon as possible, G-20 members should commit to 
enter into request/offer negotiations on services with each other 
and with any other WTO member that wants to participate. 
The PIIE analysis suggests that such an effort could yield global 
export gains of more than $50 billion.
Second, the G-20 members should ensure that benefits 
for the least-developed countries (LDCs) are broadened and 
complemented with technical and financial assistance so these 
countries can take full advantage of the new trade openings. 
Improving the Doha payoff for the LDCs would be further 
2. Note that these same members criticize other countries for making similar 
offers to reduce “bound” tariffs and subsidies to levels above currently applied 
rates. While cutting applied rates is preferable, there still is real value in reduc-
ing the gap between bound and applied rates. Such reforms increase policy 
predictability by reducing the flexibility to raise trade barriers up to the maxi-
mum level allowed under WTO obligations. In essence, such a commitment is 
an insurance policy against sudden protectionist impulses.
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evidence of the seriousness of members to meet the develop-
ment objectives of the Doha Round.
In  this  regard,  the  G-20  action  plan  should  emphasize 
credible steps that would enhance the value of existing commit-
ments to provide duty-free/quota-free (DFQF) treatment for 
the LDCs. Such action does not mean a hortatory call for free 
access for all LDC exports; committing to 100 percent DFQF 
is as meaningful as saying Doha will end in 2010. If the criteria 
for qualifying for the preferences are onerous, then beneficiary 
countries will not be able to take advantage of the preferences. 
Simply put, the promise of open market access for LDC export-
ers is often denied or curtailed by eligibility requirements, espe-
cially rules of origin.
For that reason, the G-20 leaders should agree to improve 
their  offers  for  DFQF  treatment  beyond  the  commitments 
already made in the Doha Round and avoid product excep-
tions in all but extremely limited circumstances. Total coverage 
is not feasible politically but the target should be the inclu-
sion of more than 99 percent of tariff lines. Furthermore, the 
industrial countries in the G-20 should commit to simplify and 
harmonize eligibility criteria (including rules of origin) with the 
view toward maximizing the potential benefit for LDCs. Simi-
larly, other major trading nations in the group—including large 
developing countries—should broaden their own nascent LDC 
preferences with the aim of matching the product coverage of 
the developed country schemes within five years.3
Trade and ClimaTe ChanGe
We already are witnessing political pressures in the United States 
and Europe to provide protection via subsidies and import restric-
tions to help firms offset the higher production costs that will arise 
due to carbon taxes and regulatory mandates. The G-20 countries 
should take the lead in foreswearing such actions by pushing for 
a moratorium or “peace clause” in which WTO members agree 
3. A new report issued by the Center for Global Development (CGD) offers 
ambitious proposals for reform of LDC trade preferences. See CGD 2010.
not to institute for several years new trade restrictions based on 
the carbon content of imports. In essence, such a commitment 
would extend the trade “standstill” explicitly to climate change 
policies and implicitly commit G-20 countries to avoid invok-
ing the legal provisions of GATT Article XX (general excep-
tions to WTO obligations) to justify the imposition of border 
adjustments for climate change policies. The purpose of such a 
commitment is straightforward: to avoid backdoor protectionism 
that could hamper the economic recovery and create obstacles to 
the continuing negotiation on a global post-Kyoto regime.
G-20 leaders need to promptly consider this new initiative 
at their next meeting in Toronto in June 2010, since it is quite 
possible that national legislation could institute border “adjust-
ments” well before climate negotiators develop international 
guidelines. In other words, there is a substantial risk that the 
United States, European Union, and possibly other major trad-
ing nations will set their own standards for what is comparable 
action on climate change, and impose border adjustments on 
products shipped from countries that don’t meet the grade. The 
Waxman-Markey climate bill that passed the House in 2009 
deferred the application of such border measures until 2020; 
current bills under consideration in the Senate would signifi-
cantly shorten this “grace period.” Committing to a temporary 
moratorium in the G-20 would be consistent with this legis-
lation and would “lock in” the time period in which border 
measures would not be applied.
ConClusions
G-20 summit planners, reflecting the robust recovery over the 
past six months in economic growth and international trade, 
seem to be giving trade issues short shrift on the already full 
agenda for the two scheduled meetings in 2010. Such neglect is 
shortsighted; the risk of additional protectionist impulses is still 
high and will remain so while unemployment levels continue to 
hover near double digits in the United States and Europe. 
To date, the G-20 efforts to dampen protectionism have 
recorded mixed results. The trade standstill has deterred a viru-
lent outbreak of new border restrictions but has been less effec-
tive in disciplining the use of subsidies and discriminatory regu-
latory and government procurement policies that could distort 
international trade and investment. The G-20 commitments on 
the Doha Round, by contrast, have been empty promises. 
Going forward, what should the G-20 leaders say about 
trade? They can’t ignore the issue, since it would appear to be 
backtracking from previous statements. They can’t simply repeat 
the hortatory charges on trade from the past summits, since it 
would lack credibility given past performance. In my view, the 
G-20 leaders have only one good option on trade: they need to 
take some concrete actions that demonstrate their commitment 
“G-20 summit planners, reflecting the 
robust recovery over the past six months 
in economic growth and international 
trade, seem to be giving trade issues 
short shrift on the already full agenda for 
the two scheduled meetings in 2010.”N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 1 1   m a y   2 0 1 0
4
to deterring protectionism and to advancing multilateral trade 
liberalization.
This paper recommends a course of action that could achieve 
both objectives. The first step is to revive the Doha Round with 
the aim of achieving a more ambitious and balanced result than 
currently on offer in Geneva. To that end, the G-20 countries 
need to make additional commitments to trade reforms across 
the WTO agenda. I believe this negotiating dynamic could be 
spurred by a politically courageous but substantively modest US 
offer on farm subsidies that would challenge the other G-20 
members to reciprocate. The second step is to ensure that new 
forms of green protectionism do not undercut the G-20 objec-
tives regarding “low carbon, green growth.” In this regard, I 
recommend the G-20 institute a time-limited moratorium on 
new border measures based on the carbon content of imports so 
that green protectionism does not distract from the economic 
recovery  and  disrupt  efforts  to  develop  a  new  international 
climate regime. 
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